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Abstract  
Worldwide, water scarcity threatens delivery of water to urban centres. Water pricing is often 
recommended to reduce demand. In this paper, demand and equity effects of water pricing policies are 
examined in a block pricing model that is applied to the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. Water 
demand functions are estimated using marginal and average price models based on monthly data for 
the period 1997-2002. Price elasticities of water demand range between -0.46 and -0.50 and income 
elasticities between 0.39 and 0.41. For the current combined regressive-progressive block price 
system, the poor spend almost 6% of their income on water. The rich only pay 0.6% of their income 
whereas they consume three times as much. A progressive block price system will result in a more 
equalized income distribution. However, for the system considered here, it will result as well in higher 
water demand and lower revenues for the water company.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
For an increasing number of countries, water scarcity has become a major problem. Supply 
fails to meet demand causing pressure between different water users, uses or regions. Regional 
differences are large, as within a country, some regions may have excess water availability whereas 
other regions face seasonal shortages. For the fast growing mega-cities in the world, keeping pace 
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with urbanization is difficult for local authorities and water companies and the expansion over several 
river basins makes river basin management challenging (Lundqvist et al., 2005). For example, the 
Brazilian Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP) suffers from water shortages almost yearly, due 
to which SABESP (the main Energy, Water Resources and Sanitation Secretary of the MRSP) has to 
ration water distribution. Water supplies in the MRSP come for about 40% from the Alto Tietê Basin, 
located almost entirely within the MRSP, and for 60% from neighbouring basins. The MRSP houses 
almost 50% of the state’s population whereas it only occupies 2.7% of its territory. From the Alto 
Tietê Basin, 80% of water withdrawals are for urban water use, whereas the basin is also used to drain 
off industrial effluents and as domestic sewer, has some protected areas within urbanized areas, and is 
affected by disordered urbanization in the spring areas. In Brazil, water resources are considered a 
public good for which the State holds management, cleaning and maintenance responsibility. River 
basin committees, consisting not only of representatives of the State and the cities and municipalities 
in the basins but also of participants from civil society, decide on issues like prices, expenses and 
allocation of water use rights (Jacobi, 2004; Lundqvist et al., 2005). Currently, SABESP applies a 
combined regressive-progressive block pricing system, with water prices for the second till the fifth 
consumption block increasing stepwise. The charge for the first 10 m3 is fixed, regardless of whether 
it is consumed, with a converted price per cubic meter which is considerably higher than for the other 
blocks. This system assures a safe minimum level of revenues for the water company. Many Latin 
American cities have a comparable price system, but with a first block of 15 m3 (Walker et al., 2000). 
The water tariffs in the different blocks are different for residential, commercial, industrial or 
agricultural use.  
As the economic importance of the MRSP for Brazil is substantial and the water supply 
problems will have clear impacts on social stability and economic productivity, solutions for dealing 
with the water shortages are necessary. For that reason, the main aim of this paper is to study the 
demand and equity effects of water price policies for different income groups. Moreover, it will be 
assessed to what extent price policies will in the medium to long term be cancelled out by 
demographic and climatic changes. For this purpose, a water demand function will be estimated for 
the MRSP on the basis of data on monthly water consumption, prices, income, population size, 
rainfall, temperature and water rationing. The main, extensively debated theoretical and estimation 
issues, dealing with choosing the appropriate price variables, simultaneity and auto-correlation, are 
carefully taken into account. As more urbanized metropolitan regions suffer from the same problems, 
results from this analysis have a broader scope than just the metropolitan region of São Paulo.  
A novel element of this study is its special focus on the equity effects of water pricing 
policies. Although, the last decades, many empirical studies estimated price and income elasticities of 
water demand (see e.g. Espey et al, 1997; Arbués et al., 2003 and Dalhuisen et al., 2003 for an 
overview), and many authors emphasize the importance of water pricing for water conservation 
(Azevedo and Baltar, 2005; Garcia, 2005), equity effects of pricing policies are still a largely 
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underexposed element in literature. Estimates of price elasticities usually range between -0.05 and -
0.75 whereas income elasticities are in most cases in the range of 0.05 and 0.5. Moreover, other 
variables reported to be significant include climatic variables, age distribution and household size (see 
e.g. Lyman, 1992; Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995; Renwick and Green, 2000). Price responsiveness is 
reported to be dependent on a number of factors, making the design of appropriate demand 
management policies complex (Renwick and Green, 2000; Rietveld et al., 2000; and Krause et al., 
2003). On the basis of the studies focussing on the equity effects of pricing policies, no general 
conclusions can be drawn. A large study in 17 Central American cities demonstrated large differences 
in prices paid, water demanded and price responsiveness between households connected and those not 
connected to tap water (Strand and Walker, 2005). The authors observe little income-related 
differentiation in consumption, an almost equal distribution of price subsidies between income 
quintiles and a low to zero progressivity in the subsidy system, in the sense that the poor are not 
favoured more than the rich (Walker et al., 2000). Price increases affect the poor harder than the more 
wealthy, except when many poor households are still not connected. In such situations, water 
infrastructural investments using revenues collected from price increases will substantially help the 
poor. Rietveld et al. (2000) for Indonesia and Hajispyrou et al. (2002) for Cyprus point at the negative 
welfare effects of block price systems compared to a flat price system. A flat price system removes 
prices distortions but at the expense of some groups of consumers, which usually are the low income 
groups or the larger households. For Western countries, empirical evidence shows that equity effects 
of block pricing schemes are ambiguous (Hajispyrou et al. 2002).  
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section presents a brief review of the water 
demand literature and the main discussion points to be considered when estimating a water demand 
function. The third and fourth sections describe the data, methodology, estimation results and 
analysis, respectively. In these sections, the main question of the study will be answered: Are price 
policies effective to decrease residential water demand in MRSP; how will these policies affect equity 
and will population and climate change increase the need for such policies? The paper ends by 
drawing some conclusions on the effects of the policies analysed.  
 
2. Estimating Water Demand: a review of methodological issues 
In the last decades much has been written on problems encountered when estimating water 
demand functions in a block price system (see e.g. Arbués et al. (2003) for an overview). While using 
micro-level data is optimal to account for inter-household differences in price-levels, this study as 
well as most other studies rely on aggregate data because disaggregate data are not available (Hewitt 
and Hanemann, 1995; Pint, 1999). For the same reason, panel data methods remain under-explored 
(Pint, 1999; Arbués et al.,2000; Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges, 2001), whereas the use of random 
coefficient models or dynamic specifications could shed more light on the seasonal effects of water 
demand policies and the seasonal trends in water demand. Given the type of data available, two 
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important issues remain: (1) whether to use marginal or average price in the estimation; and (2) the 
simultaneity problem between price and quantity. 
In a block price system, average and marginal prices differ. It depends on the way consumers 
are informed whether they respond to average or marginal prices or to lagged prices. In much of the 
earlier work, marginal price is the only price related variable included in water demand functions 
(Arbués et al., 2003). Taylor (1975) is one of the first commenting on this, stating that the use of 
average or marginal price does not represent reality. He indicates that there is also an income effect 
due to the change of price when consumption moves to another consumption block. Nordin (1976) 
complements Taylor’s comments suggesting the use of marginal price and a difference variable which 
represents the income effect. This variable represents the difference between the consumer’s actual 
water bill and the expenditures in case the entire consumption were charged at the marginal price. Its 
effect on water demand is hypothesized to be of the same magnitude of the income effect but with 
opposite sign. This, however, is not confirmed by much of the empirical literature in which difference 
variables are not significant or do not have the proper magnitude (Billings and Agthe, 1980; Jones and 
Morris, 1984) or are of incorrect sign and not highly significant (Howe, 1982; Foster and Beattie, 
1979, 1981; Chicoine and Ramamurthy, 1986). Reasons reported are that consumers are poorly 
informed, that difference variables are only a very small fraction of household income (Nieswiadomy 
and Molina, 1989), or that estimates are biased (Schefter and David, 1985). Moreover, due to lags in 
payments of water bills, lagged average prices instead of marginal prices and difference variables 
should be used (Charney and Woodward, 1984). An important comment on Taylor and Nordin’s 
approaches is that marginal price would only result in superior statistical estimates if consumers are 
well informed about the pricing system (Billings and Agthe, 1980; Foster and Beattie, 1981, Griffin 
and Martin, 1981). Well-informed consumers will react to marginal price changes and Nordin’s 
difference variable. However, due to information costs, most consumers will not spend much effort on 
keeping informed about (intra)marginal price changes and just respond to average price (Billings and 
Agthe, 1980; Bachrach and Vaughan, 1994). For that reason, Opaluch (1982, 1984) proposes a model 
with a decomposed measure of average and marginal price in order to detect whether consumers 
respond to average or marginal prices. Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986) conclude from testing 
Opaluch’s model that the appropriate behavioural model is an empirical question that must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis.  
Next to the problem of adopting the appropriate price variable, a simultaneity problem arises 
because in a block rate system marginal and average prices are endogenously determined by quantity 
demanded. Therefore, the explanatory variables and error term may be correlated, in which case 
parameter estimation using OLS will be biased and inconsistent and instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques, such as 2SLS and 3SLS are to be preferred. Some studies, however, show that OLS and 
IV techniques give similar results for water demand elasticities and, therefore, a simpler OLS may be 
appropriate even in the presence of simultaneity (Jones and Morris, 1984; Chicoine and Ramamurthy, 
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1986; Saleth and Dinar, 2000). However, other studies do find biased OLS results due to simultaneity 
(Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1988). Testing for simultaneity by using a Hausman test (Billings and 
Agthe, 1980) easily shows whether simultaneity is present and whether IV techniques should be used.  
 
3. Data and model 
The model used in this study is based upon the neoclassical theory of consumer demand, 
which specifies four determinants of quantity demanded: price, prices of related goods, income, and 
preferences. As water has no close substitutes, we assume all cross-price elasticities to be negligible. 
Below, we discuss the data used to specify the remaining three factors and the econometric model 
used to estimate water demand.  
Data for monthly water consumption for the period 1996 – 2004 are obtained from SABESP, 
which provides its services to 39 municipalities which almost cover the entire MRSP. The data cover 
total consumption, total residential consumption, the number of connections, and the occurrence of 
rationing. For converting residential consumption to per capita consumption, we interpolate yearly 
population data obtained from SEADE, the State Data Analysis System Foundation, to monthly data. 
Residential consumption corresponds approximately to 80% of total consumption and per capita 
consumption follows a similar pattern as total residential consumption. There is no clear trend in any 
of the consumption variables (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Total, residential and per capita water consumption in the MRSP for the period 1996-2004 
(in m3/month). 
Source: data obtained from SABESP and SEADE 
 
Data on water prices for the five consumption blocks are available from SABESP for the 
period July 97-December 2004. Prices are deflated using the Brazilian price index IPCA/IBGE, which 
is available on a monthly basis. Therefore, the resulting time series covers prices that change monthly 
(see Figure 2). The first block price, p1, is the highest and applies to the first 10m3 of water consumed 
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in a year. For the other blocks, prices increase stepwise with the price in block 5 still lower than that 
in block 1. Block prices p2, p3, p4, and p5 (in Real/m3)1 are charged for quantities consumed per 
connection in the ranges of 11-20 m3/year, 21-30 m3/year, 31-50 m3/year, and 50 m3/year onwards, 
respectively. In the data set, average consumption per household (total residential water consumption 
divided by number of connections) is always in the third block. Although we are aware that individual 
households may be in different consumption blocks each with its own marginal price, because our 
data are aggregated for all households, we interpret p3 as the marginal price of household water 
consumption. 
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Figure 2. Block prices for water in the MRSP for the period 1997-2002 (in Real/m3, base year 1997). 
Source: data obtained from SABESP 
 
Income is expected to be an important determinant of residential water demand. The water 
company suggests that the income effect in water consumption is more important than the price effect. 
Yearly income data at the MRSP level for the period 1996-2003 are obtained from the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (PNAD/IBGE). Income is deflated using the IPCA/IBGE price 
index (see Figure 3). The main reasons of the peculiar form of income development are most likely 
the differences in economic growth between 2001 and 2002 and the elections in 2002. 
 
                                                     
1
 1 Real = € 0.37. 
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Figure 3. Real monthly per capita income in the MRSP for the period 1996 – 2003 (in Real/month, 
base year 1997). 
Source: IBGE 
 
At the aggregate level, water preferences are best measured by including monthly data on 
rainfall and temperature, which is provided by the Institute of Atmosphere and Geography (IAG). For 
example, demand for garden watering will be highest in the dry season, whereas demand for water 
will increase when temperatures are high, because of high evaporation and high demand for water for 
swimming pools, laundry and washing. 
 
Using the data discussed above, monthly water demand functions are estimated. Because of 
the lack of consensus on the most appropriate price specification to be used, we first use Opaluch’s 
(1982) approach to show whether an average or a marginal price model should be adopted. For our 
data, the null hypotheses of Opaluch’s model to test to which prices consumers respond are both not 
rejected, showing that it can not be concluded whether consumers respond to average or marginal 
prices. For that reason, we estimate two models – one based on average price and one on marginal 
price – and compare the results.  
The average price model for month  is specified as follows: 
 
ττττττττ εααααααα 16543210 +++++++= timerartyapq , 
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in which q is per capita consumption of water (m3/month), ap is the average price (Real/m3), y is per 
capita income (Real/month), t is average temperature in month  (degrees Celcius), r is rainfall 
(mm/month), ra is a dummy for whether rationing occurred in month  and time is a time trend.  
For the marginal-price model, we followed the specification of Nordin (1976):  
 
τττττττττ εββββββββ 276543210 ++++++++= timerartydmpq ,  
  
in which mp is the marginal price (Real/m3) and dt the difference variable (Real/month), i.e., what 
consumers actually pay minus what they would pay if the only price were the marginal price. For 
example, if consumption is in block 3, then mp = p3 and d = (p1q1 + p2(q2-q1) + p3(q-q2)) – p3q in 
which q1 and q2 are the maximum consumption levels in block 1 and 2, respectively. 
We test for endogeneity in both equations, using block prices as instruments. As the marginal 
price is very highly correlated with some of the block prices, instrumentation makes no sense, and we 
use OLS for the marginal price model.  For the average price model, exogeneity is rejected at the 5% 
level, and we use 2SLS estimation. Moreover, Breusch Godfrey tests for autocorrelation indicate that 
autocorrelation is present in both models, which is corrected by including lagged consumption and 
lagged rainfall. Finally, we use Chow tests to assess potential differences in coefficients between 
periods with and without rationing. As we can not reject equality of coefficients, we pool all data in 
single regressions and include only a dummy for rationing, as specified in the mathematical 
representation of the models above. 
 
4. Results and analysis 
Estimation results 
The results for the average and marginal price models are very similar (see Table 1). All 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and the signs of the coefficients are as expected. The price 
variables are negatively correlated with consumption in all the models, as expected from demand 
theory. The same holds for rainfall and the rationing dummy. The more it rains (in the current and in 
the previous month), the less water will be consumed, because less garden watering will be necessary 
and there will be less swimming-pool activities. When there is water rationing, water use logically 
decreases. The time trend coefficient also has a negative sign, which shows that per capita water 
consumption has decreased over time. 
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Table 1: Regressions estimates per capita water demand for alternative price specifications. 
 Descriptives Average price model 
(2SLS estimationa) 
Marginal price model 
(OLS estimation) 
Variables mean s.d. Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic 
Average price 1.47 0.09 -1.43779 -3.47   
Marginal price 1.43 0.06   -1.34114 -3.11 
Difference 1.06 1.37   -0.06629 -3.15 
Income 745.20 26.43 0.00220 3.93 0.00232 3.80 
Temperature 19.61 2.59 0.05165 7.58 0.05239 7.53 
Rainfall 118.61 90.27 -0.00035 -2.21 -0.00036 -2.23 
Rationing dummy 0.26 0.44 -0.08628 -3.21 -0.08634 -3.15 
Time trend   -0.00859 -4.43 -0.00886 -4.33 
Lagged consumption   0.25804 3.15 0.27596 3.22 
Lagged rainfall   -0.00039 -2.54 -0.00040 -2.50 
constant   2.99163 4.07 2.69738 3.24 
Adjusted R2   0.84  0.83  
F statistic   41.90  35.91  
Sample size   65  65  
Notes: a) Instrumented ap; instruments: p1, p2, p3, p5 and exogenous model variables. All 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
 
Temperature, income and lagged water consumption affect current water consumption 
positively. Warm weather will induce people to take more showers, do their laundry more frequently, 
water their garden frequently, and use swimming pools, and therefore the use of water will increase. 
The higher income, the higher water consumption will be. As income increases, the water bill will 
correspond to a smaller part of the total expenditure. In lower income families, the water bill 
corresponds to a more significant part of the income, and they will be more concerned in saving 
water. Lagged water consumption also affects current consumption positively, because this variable 
includes some of the individual preferences and habits driving demand and as it takes time for habits 
to adjust.  
According to Nordin’s specification, the difference variable coefficient should have the same 
magnitude of the income coefficient, but with opposite sign. Like in most previous studies, this 
hypothesis is strongly rejected. The literature gives several explanations for this deviation of empirics 
from theory. Schefter and David (1985) argue the use of aggregate date results in incorrect 
specification of the model, which leads to biased results. On the other hand, Nieswiadomy and Molina 
(1989) reason that the observed deviation may reflect the real situation, since consumers often lack 
information about the tariff structure and that the difference variable amounts to only a small fraction 
of total household income.  
To assess the impact of changes in price and income on water demand, we use the regression 
results to compute elasticities (see Table 2). The elasticities resulting from the two models are very 
similar. Water demand is shown to be price inelastic, but still reactive to prices: a one percent increase 
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in prices results in a 0.5 percent decrease in water demand. Income is also an important factor in water 
consumption. A one percent increase in real income results in a 0.4% increase in water demand. 
 
Table 2. Price and income elasticities of water demand    
 Average price model Marginal price model 
Average price -0.50  
Marginal price  -0.46 
Income 0.39 0.41 
Note: All elasticities are computed at mean values of demand and price or income. 
 
Scenario analysis 
The demand function estimates show that income and price have a clear influence on water 
demand. Price increases will reduce demand, which may in the future be cancelled out by demand 
increases due to economic or population growth. In order to assess the effects of alternative price 
policies, we analyse to what extent price changes will affect demand for the different income 
quintiles. Moreover, we will carefully look at the equity effects of policy changes. For this purpose, in 
the marginal price model as estimated above, the variables price and income and the difference 
variable will be adjusted according to the policy introduced and the income group considered. We are 
aware that extrapolating the results from our analysis may result in biased estimates of real demand, 
especially for the low and high income groups, but argue that the analysis still gives a good indication 
of the income distribution effects of price policies. 
Table 3 shows the share of national income and the average income levels for people in each 
of the five income quintiles. Data on income distribution for São Paulo are not available and therefore 
we used data for the whole of Brazil. Even though income distribution might be somewhat different in 
São Paulo, as it is one of the economic centres of the country, the data clearly show the effect of the 
current price system on the poorer parts of the population. The poorest 20% of the population spends 
about 5.8% of their income on water. On the other hand, the richest 20% of the population only 
spends 0.6% of their income on water, even though they consume more than three times as much. The 
average costs of water of 1.0% of the average annual income are in line with micro data from the 
Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), which report for the MRSP water expenses as 
part of total expenses to be on average 0.77%. The analysis clearly shows that under the current water 
pricing system, the unequal income distribution in Brazil induces the poorest part of the population to 
spend a considerable part of their income on water. Moreover, due to the combined regressive-
progressive block system, the average water price for the poorest part of the population is higher than 
for the other income groups. This implicitly means that the poor subsidize water demand for the more 
wealthy inhabitants.  
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Table 3. Income, demand and water bill per income quintile. 
Income 
quintile1 
Income 
share2 
Average 
annual per 
capita income 
(Real) 
Household 
demand (m3)3 
Water bill 
(Real) 
Average price 
(Real/m3)4 
Water bill as 
% of 
household 
income 
1 2.16% 966 194.1 337.4 1.74 5.8% 
2 5.41% 2419 214.4 345.7 1.61 2.4% 
3 10.06% 4499 242.7 362.4 1.49 1.3% 
4 18.31% 8188 293.7 433.0 1.47 0.9% 
5 64.06% 28647 638.3 1104.2 1.73 0.6% 
average  8944 316.6 516.5 1.63 1.0% 
Notes: 1) quintile 1 corresponds to the 20% of the population having the lowest income, quintile 5 
corresponds to the 20% of the population having the highest income; 2) incomes shares for 1998, 
source: World Bank (2003); 3) average number of consumers per connection in São Paulo is 6.01,  
number of connections and population data obtained from SABESP and SEADE, www.seade.gov.br; 
4) average price = water bill / household demand. 
 
Effects of changes in block prices are presented in Table 4 for seven scenarios of price 
changes. We analyse the following scenarios (for average values of current monthly prices, see Table 
A1 in the appendix): 
a) Increase all prices with 10% 
b) Decrease p1 with 25% and keep the other prices at their original level 
c) Decrease p1 with 40%, increase p2 and p3 with 10% and increase p4 and p5 with 25% 
d) For income quintile 1, 2 and 3, decrease p1 with 40%, increase p2 and p3 with 10% and increase p4 
and p5 with 25% and for income quintile 4 and 5, keep p1 at its current level, increase p2 and p3 
with 10% and increase p4 and p5 with 25% 
e) Set all prices at 1 Real/m3 
f) Set all prices at 1.5 Real/m3 
g) Set all prices at 2 Real/m3 
 In Scenario a, in which all block prices increase with the same percentage, the poorer part of 
the population is most affected. For them, demand and average price change the most, and the water 
bill becomes even a larger percentage of their income. Price increases are, however, an effective 
instrument to reduce water demand. An overall price increase of 10% results in a reduction of total 
water demand of 4.1%, even though it is especially at the expense of water demand for the poorest 
inhabitants. On the other hand in Scenario b, in which the price of the first block decreases, especially 
the poor population benefits. For them, a reduction of p1 with 25% results in an increase of demand 
with almost 16% and a considerable reduction of the average price and the water bill. For this 
scenario, the entire population benefits even though the richer population will be less affected. For the 
water company, however, revenues collected will decrease. For a reduction of p1 with 25%, their 
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revenues decrease with almost 8%. Such a reduction might endanger their financial situation and 
therefore the quality of the water distribution system.  
 
Table 4. Effects of changes in the price system on demand, average price and water bill for different 
income groups and on revenues collected by the water company. Percentage changes are compared 
with the current situation as presented in Table 3. 
Scenario Income quintile Average 
 1 2 3 4 5  
a) Increase all prices with 10% 
% Change in demand -7.3% -6.6% -5.6% -4.9% -1.3% -4.1% 
Average price (Real) 2.03 1.87 1.68 1.62 1.90 1.83 
% Change in water bill 8.1% 8.2% 6.3% 4.8% 8.1% 7.3%1 
b) Decrease p1 with 25% 
% Change in demand 15.8% 13.9% 12.4% 10.4% 4.8% 9.6% 
Average price (Real) 1.22 1.18 1.20 1.23 1.64 1.37 
% Change in water bill -19.1% -16.9% -9.9% -7.6% -0.7% -7.7%1 
c) Decrease p1 with 40%, increase p2 and p3 with 10%, and increase p4 and p5 with 25% 
% Change in demand 23.9% 21.3% 19.1% 16.0% 11.2% 16.2% 
Average price (Real) 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.90 1.40 
% Change in water bill -28.1% -22.0% -13.0% -8.4% 22.2% -0.3%1 
d) Quintile 1-3: -40%, +10%, +10%, +25%, +25%; Quintile 4-5: +0%, +10%, +10%, +25%, +25% 
% Change in demand 11.6% 10.3% 9.1% -0.7% 3.6% 5.5% 
Average price (Real) 1.33 1.27 1.28 1.52 2.02 1.62 
% Change in water bill -14.3% -13.2% -6.6% 2.1% 20.9% 4.7%1 
e) All prices equal to 1 Real/m3 
% Change in demand 11.1% 10.0% 9.1% 7.7% -5.7% 3.2% 
% Change in water bill -20.1% -14.7% -8.6% -8.7% -31.9% -20.9%1 
f) All prices equal to 1.5 Real/m3 
% Change in demand -1.42 -1.3% -0.9% -0.6% -9.5% -4.4% 
% Change in water bill -14.9% -8.2% -0.4% 1.2% -21.5% -12.1%1 
g) All prices equal to 2 Real/m3 
% Change in demand -26.4% -23.9% -20.8% -17.0% -17.1% -19.7% 
% Change in water bill -15.3% -5.6% 6.1% 12.6% -4.2% -1.6%1 
Notes: 1) represents the change in revenues collected by the water company SABESP. 
 
As Scenario c shows, however, a reduction of p1 combined with an increase of the other 
block prices can result in a system which is budget neutral for the water company and in which the 
poor do not have to bear the largest burdens. A drawback of such an equalized pricing system is, 
however, a considerable increase of water demand. Table 4 shows that for this scenario demand may 
increase with 16%. Considering the current water scarcities in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo, 
this may cause additional problems in the security of water deliveries and an increased number of 
water cuts. Scenario d shows that a price differentiation based on income might partly solve this. A 
reduction of p1 only for the first three income groups combined with a price increase for the other 
blocks will result in a total increase of water demand of only 5%, a slightly increased financial 
situation of the water company and a considerable reduction of the water bill for the poorer income 
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groups. The increase of the water bill of 20% for the richest groups still corresponds to a water bill of 
only 0.8% of annual income, whereas the reduction of 14% for the poorest people corresponds to a 
water bill of 5.0% of annual income. The increased demand for the highest income group is most 
likely caused by extrapolation biases due to which the difference variable, which is negative for the 
price levels adopted, has a stronger effect than the price effect. If demand would decrease, which is 
more likely if a more precise demand function were available for this income group, total demand 
increase would be smaller than 5%. 
The results of Scenario e, f and g show that introducing a flat price system will not improve 
much the water situation of the MRSP (see Table 4 and Figure 4). For high enough price levels 
(Scenario g), water demand will considerably decrease. However, demand for the poorer parts of the 
population will decrease the most. The water bill of the poorest income groups reduces most. 
However, this reduction is less than the reduction of their demand. Changes in the water bill are 
affected both by water demand and price levels. For all income groups, the percentage change of the 
water bill shows a quadratic path, but it depends on the income group at what price level the 
percentage change of the water bill starts to decrease again (see Figure 4). In the increasing parts of 
the graphs in Figure 4, the price increases have a larger effect than demand reductions. In the second 
part, the reverse happens. For reasonable price levels, the water company will experience a reduction 
in the revenues collected. Only for a price level of 2.25 Real/m3 their revenues remain stable (an 
increase of 0.2%). A further increase of water prices, however, again leads to a reduction of revenues 
collected due to the large reductions of water demand.  
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Figure 4: Effects of a flat price system on the water bill for different income quintiles. 
Note: % change in water bill compared to the current water bill; see Tables 3 and 4. 
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Summarizing, this analysis shows that designing a water pricing system that both considers 
equity and reduces demand is difficult. A system that applies for the entire population is either good 
for equity or reduces demand. Only price differentiation based on income levels could result in a 
possible reduction of water demand which does not disproportionally affect the poorer income groups. 
However, the administrative costs of such a system may be inhibitive and one can wonder whether 
such a price system is politically feasible. 
 
Demand changes due to changing pricing systems may be cancelled out by a number of 
structural changes. Income growth and population growth will already in the short run result in 
demand increases. In the state of São Paulo, for the next 5 years, a population growth is expected of 
1.4% per year (SEADE)2. As a result, even if SABESP succeeds in reducing individual water demand 
by 5%, total demand will exceed current demand already in four years. As urban population growth is 
expected to be somewhat higher than total growth in the state of São Paulo, this point might even be 
reached at an earlier stage. For that reason, although pricing policies remain necessary to give 
consumers the correct signal on the value of the water they are consuming, much attention should be 
paid to alternative water saving policies. Such policies should focus on more conscious water demand 
habits and the promotion of water saving devices. Moreover, income growth will also lead to an 
increased demand of water. However, as average GDP per capita has decreased during the last 5 years 
according to the 2005 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005), no forecasts can be made 
of the rate of increase of demand due to income growth.  
Finally, precipitation and temperature changes due to climate change are likely to have an 
effect on water demand. Climate scenarios for the next 15 and 45 years as presented by IPCC3 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) predict a temperature increase of on average 3% in the year 2050 and 
an increase of average annual rainfall of 0.3%. Monthly changes, however, may be larger. The largest 
increase in temperature is reported to be in the period March-April with an average increase of 4.6% 
and an increase of precipitation of 1.9% in the months October-November and a reduction in 
precipitation of about 1% in the months January–March. Although effects of these envisaged climate 
changes may be important for agriculture, our demand models indicate that they are small for 
domestic water demand. The changes in precipitation have a negligible effect on water demand. The 
increase of temperature has an effect exceeding 1% only in the warm months march and April. 
Income and population growth most likely have a much larger effect than climate change. 
 
                                                     
2
 See www.seade.gov.br. 
3
 See also the Climate Scenarios’ Data Visualization at the IPCC Data Distribution Centre, http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk/.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, water demand is estimated for the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. This 
region is one of the most developed parts of the country, with a significant share of the population of 
Brazil. Due to recent developments with regard to water pricing policies and due to the increasing 
problems of water scarcity in urban areas in Brazil as well as in many other parts of the world, the 
results of this study are useful for other cities as well. In this study two water demand models are 
estimated. The first estimates a water demand function as a function of the average water price. The 
second follows Nordin’s specification in which the marginal price and a difference variable account 
for the effect of price on water demand. The results of the analyses and the resulting demand and 
income elasticities are very similar for both models and do not deviate much from results reported in 
other studies. Price and income elasticities of water demand are shown to be inelastic, -0.46 and -0.50 
for the price elasticities and 0.39 and 0.41 for the income elasticities.  
The marginal price model is used to assess the effects of alternative price policies on water 
demand for five income quintiles in the MRSP. Even though this analysis could be refined if 
household data on water demand and income levels were available, the analysis shows interesting 
results on the effects of price changes on water demand. The current price system has a combined 
regressive-progressive block system, in which the water price in the first block is the most expensive. 
The main reason for this is to assure the financial viability of the water company. A result of this price 
system is, however, that water is an expensive commodity for the poorest part of the population. 
Average prices are higher for the lowest than for the richer parts of the population and expenses on 
water as percentage of the total income are almost 10 times as high for the poorest 20% of the 
population than for the richest 20%. A drawback of the current system is that the poor subsidize water 
for the rich. Changing the water pricing system in such a way that equity is improved, demand is 
reduced and the financial situation of the water company does not deteriorate is, however, difficult. A 
more equitable price system will either result in an increased demand or a deteriorated financial 
situation of the water company. An income dependent price system, in which the richer income 
groups pay higher prices for all or the first few consumption blocks, may partly solve the problem, 
even though administrative costs of such a system may be inhibitive. Population and income growth 
may cancel out water savings achieved by changes in the price system already in the short run. 
Forecasted temperature and precipitation changes due to climate change, however, hardly have an 
influence on residential water demand. In order to regulate water demand changes resulting from 
these structural effects, water pricing policies can probably not reach the intended goals. Pricing 
policies should be combined with alternative policies dealing with water consciousness and promoting 
water saving devices. Future research should be carried out to assess the short and long term effects of 
such policies. Nevertheless, in order to continuously give consumers the incentive to use water in a 
conscious way, pricing policies will remain necessary. One can wonder whether the current combined 
regressive-progressive price policy in the MRSP gives the right signal to these consumers.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Average monthly prices for the period 1997-2002 for the five blocks (in Real/month). 
 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 
January 2.59 0.41 1.44 2.05 2.27 
February 2.58 0.41 1.43 2.04 2.26 
March 2.57 0.41 1.42 2.03 2.24 
April 2.55 0.40 1.42 2.02 2.23 
May 2.55 0.40 1.41 2.01 2.23 
June 2.54 0.40 1.41 2.01 2.22 
July 2.56 0.41 1.45 2.07 2.29 
August 2.58 0.41 1.45 2.07 2.29 
September 2.57 0.41 1.45 2.07 2.29 
October 2.56 0.41 1.44 2.06 2.27 
November 2.54 0.41 1.43 2.04 2.25 
December 2.53 0.41 1.42 2.03 2.24 
Source: Data obtained from SABESP. 
 
